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RECENT DECISIONS
unity was adhered to even after the passage of the Enabling Acts,16
the theory has suffered many inroads. For all legal purposes the
husband and wife should no longer be considered as one person.17
S.L.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - DIVORCE - ALIMONY PROVISIONS -
AMENDMENT THEREOF.-Plaintiff appeals from a modification of a
judgment of divorce which reduced the alimony provision of such
judgment from $21,000 per annum to $14,000 per annum. While
living apart plaintiff and defendant entered into a voluntary separation
agreement on December 15, 1929. Several weeks later plaintiff ob-
tained a divorce frorm defendant and the judgment, entered January
24, 1929, incorporated the stipulations of the separation agreement
including the annual payment of $21,000 by the defendant for the
support of the plaintiff and two children. The evidence proved that
the defendant's income was much greater in 1929 than in 1938, and in
1929 the anticipation of his future income was based on foundations
apparently secure. The plaintiff contends that the provisions for the
support of wife and issue incorporated in a decree of divorce pursuant
to a valid separation agreement of the parties may not be changed or
modified without the consent of both parties thereto.1 Held, the
statutory power 2 of the court to modify its decrees is not affected by
the fact that the decree adopted an agreement of the parties, though it
is true that the contractual obligation could not be so modified without
the consent of both interested parties. Goldman v. Goldnun, 282
N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265 (1940).
New York courts unequivocally follow the majority opinions in
the United States to the effect that they have power to modify a judg-
ment of divorce, though such be an adoption of an agreement of the
parties.4 In the instant case the Court of Appeals has clarified any
doubt which may have arisen through the decision laid down in the
16 People ex rel. Troare v. McClelland, 146 Misc. 545, 263 N. Y. Supp. 403
(1933).
17 Mattison v. N. Y. Cent. L RL, 23 N. Y. 529 (1862).
1 Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893).
2 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT §§ 1155, 1170.
3 Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925); Langrall v.
Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 125 Atl. 695 (1924) ; Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297,
172 N. E. 251 (1930) ; Fox v. Fox, 263 N. Y. 68, 188 N.E. 160 (1933) ; Levy
v. Levy, 149 App. Div. $61, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1084 (1st Dept. 1912); Blake v.
Blake, 15 Wis. 339, 43 N. W. 144 (1889). Contra: Connolly v. Connolly, 16
Ohio App. 92 (1922) ; Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Ore. 141, 60 Pac. 597 (1900).
4 Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N. Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dept.
1930) (A modification of an alimony provision of a decree of divorce based on
a voluntary separation agreement was granted on proof by petitioner that justice
so required).
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case of Galusha v,. Galusha.5 As the Court succinctly points out, the
instant case is different in that here the defendant does not attack the
validity of the prior agreement. Where a court finds that two parties
have entered into an agreement, it will not lend its aid to vacate or
modify such agreement unless it is found to be fraudulent, voidable,
illegal, unenforceable or tainted with duress. In the instant case the
only aid requested from the court is that it modify its own decree; but
not the mutual agreement made by the parties. Section 1155 of the
New York Civil Practice Act 6 has empowered the courts of this State
to modify a final judgment'of divorce in so far as the alimony 7 pro-
vision is concerned, if justice so requires.8 Similarly, Secti6n 1170 9
of the Civil Practice Act makes provisions which, in effect, write a
reservation into every final judgment of divorce and prolong the juris-
diction of the courts over the parties and the subject matter.10 When
a separation agreement is entered into by the parties, and, subse-
quently, a divorce is procured, the courts may direct the husband to
pay the amount which the parties have agreed to constitute suitable
provisions for the support of a wife and children. However, such a
direction is no more inviolate from future change by the court than a
judgment rendered after a controversy between the parties as to what
suitable and just amount should be awarded the wife. The rights of
the parties arise out of the judgment itself," and such a judgment
must be read as if it included an express reservation that it might be
thereafter annulled, varied or modified pursuant to Section 1155 of the
Civil Practice Act. The mere fact that a prior agreemeAt existed
5 Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1898) (the court
refused aid to one seeking to have a decree modified by attacking the validity
of the voluntary separation agreement of the parties).
6 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1155 ("The court, in the final judgment dissolving
the marriage in an action for .divgrce brought by the wife, may require the
defendant to provide suitably for the education and maintenance of the children
of the marriage, and for the support of the plaintiff, as justice requires having
regard to the circumstances of the'respective parties; and, by order, upon the
application of either party to the action, and after due notice to the other, to be
given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, at any time after final judg-
ment whether heretofore or hereafter rendered, may annul, vary or modify such
a direction * * * ").
7 Herrick v. Herrick, 314 Ill. 146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925) ("Alimony" does
not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage, and
is not founded on contract, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to
support the wife, and is that allowance out of the estate of her husband which is
made to a woman on a decree of divorce for her support) ; Collins v. Collins,
80 N. Y. 1 (1898) ("The matter of alimony is regulated by statute").
8 Walker v. Walker, 155 N. Y. 77, 49 N. E. 663 (1898) (Prior to 1891 the
courts had no authority to change the amount of alimony in New York State
allowed after a final judgment had been entered).
9 N. Y. Civ. P Ac. AcT § 1170 ("The court, by order, upon the application
of either party to the action, * * * after due notice to the other, to be given in
such manner as the court shall prescribe, at any time after final judgment, may
annul, vary or modify such directions * * * ").
10 Fox v. Fox, 263 N. Y. 68, 188 N. E. 160 (1933).
11 Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297, 172 N. E. 251 (1930).
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between the parties cannot and does not limit the powers of the court
conferred by statute. Nevertheless, courts in awarding alimony have
no power to abrogate or modify any provisions of a separation agree-
ment without the mutual consent of the parties,12 and, though the
terms of a separation agreement have been incorporated in a subse-
quent decree of divorce, the statutory authority to modify alimony
awards does not warrant the alteration of such prior separation agree-
ment.13 The contractual obligation is still enforceable in courts of
law, but the special and drastic remedies afforded by statute "4 for
failure to adhere to an alimony judgment can be resorted to only
where there is a failure to pay the amount fixed in the modified
judgment.
S.C.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - FOREIGN DIVoRcE - JURISDICTION -
ESTOPPEL.-(First Case) Defendant and his first wife were domiciled
in this state. While retaining his residence here, defendant went to
Reno, Nevada, where he obtained a decree of divorce from his wife
who neither appeared nor was personally served in that action, but
who at all times remained a resident of New York State. Subse-
quently, defendant married the present plaintiff, who now sues him for
separation. Defendant contends this action cannot be maintained as
the Nevada decree is invalid in this state and that he is therefore not
legally married to plaintiff. Held, the Nevada court, having no juris-
diction, could not render a decree that would be valid here; 1 however,
defendant sought the judgment and may not now be heard to impeach
it.2 Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940).
(Second Case) Plaintiff sues defendant for separation. Plain-
tiff had been previously married to a Canadian citizen who was a resi-
dent of Quebec. While living separate and apart from him, she met
the defendant. Solely through defendant's aid, she came to New
York and then went immediately to Nevada where she obtained upon
service by publication a divorce from her husband, in which action
both plaintiff and defendant took part. Defendant claims the Nevada
divorce is invalid. Held, plaintiff, having invoked the jurisdiction of
the Nevada court, would be estopped from denying the validity of its
2 Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893).
13 Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Ore. 141, 60 Pac. 597 (1900).
14 See N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT §§ 1171, 1171-a, 1171-b, 1172.
'Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273 (1901); Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508 (1920); Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y.
131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933).
2 Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1901); Hynes v.
Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612, 7 N. E. (2d) 719 (1937) ; Brown
v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dept. 1934).
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